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Abstract: The “Greek Case” which led to the de facto suspension of Greece in 1969 was a very 
particular part of the history of the Council of Europe in the protection of human rights and 
democracy. This contribution, based on a keynote given at a pertinent conference in Athens, will 
ask whether the spirit and political will to confront major human rights violations existing at that 
time can still be found in the Council of Europe of today. It will investigate the impact on the work 
of the Council of Europe at the time and draw some conclusions on lessons learned for today. In 
this context it will highlight the role of personalities acting on behalf of the Council of Europe at 
the time. It will also analyse the impact of its enlarged membership on the upholding of its values 
today. The institutions and tools at the disposal of the Council of Europe as the democratic 
conscience of Europe against democratic backsliding then and today will be compared with a 
view to the question of their effectiveness. In this context the examples of the Russian Federation 
and of Turkey regarding the challenges from anti-liberal forces and authoritarianism for 
democracy and human rights will be addressed as will be the use of the state of emergency. Which 
factors influence the “socialization” of member states to become guardians of common European 
values? Is the Council of Europe able to meet its accountability towards the citizens of Europe? 
This will lead to some conclusions on the legacy of the “Greek Case” for a proper response to the 
challenges of democratic backsliding and a shrinking space for human rights and the rule of law 
in the Council of Europe today as well as some recommendations for the future. 
Keywords: Council of Europe, Inter-state application, human rights tools, democracy, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Greece, Russian Federation, Turkey. 
I. Introduction1 
The “Greek Case” has a central place in the history of the performance of the Council of Europe in 
the protection of human rights and democracy. It was a test case whether the bodies of the Council 
of Europe would be able to live up to the principles of their organization. This contribution will 
address some elements of this challenge and ask the question whether the political will to confront 
 
* Wolfgang Benedek is Professor at the Institute of International Law and International Relations of the University of 
Graz and former Director of the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy of the 
University of Graz. 
1  This contribution is based on a keynote given at the International Conference on The “Greek Case” in the Council 
of Europe: A Game Changer for International Law and Human Rights? National and Kapodistrian University of 
Athens, 14 December 2019. Particular thanks go to Peter Leuprecht for his feedback on this contribution. 
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major human rights violations existing at that time can still be found in the Council of Europe of 
today. Has there been a particular impact on the work of the Council of Europe at the time and 
what are the lessons learned for today? What are the similarities and differences at stake? What 
was the role of the personalities acting on behalf of the Council of Europe and what is the impact 
of its enlarged membership today? Furthermore, the institutions and tools at the disposal of the 
Council of Europe as the democratic conscience of Europe against democratic backsliding then and 
today will be compared asking the question what are the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
their use. Which are the factors influencing the “socialization” of member states to become 
guardians of common European values? In this context present-time challenges from anti-liberal 
forces and authoritarianism for democracy and human rights will be addressed using the recent 
practice of the Russian Federation and of Turkey, while other examples like Azerbaijan will not be 
dealt with in any detail for lack of space. How has the Council of Europe dealt with the state of 
emergency declared by Turkey in 2016 and how did it deal with the declarations of emergency in 
the so-called Corona crises? The conclusions will focus on what is the message of the “Greek Case” 
for a proper response to the challenges of democratic backsliding and a shrinking space for human 
rights and the rule of law in the Council of Europe today. Finally, some recommendations for the 
future will be made. 
II. Particularities of the “Greek Case” and Impact at the Time 
A. Particularities of the “Greek Case” 
1. Responsibility taken by Member States 
In April 1967 the government of Greece was overthrown by a military coup. Efforts by the Council 
of Europe towards a return to democracy of the colonels remained without result. In this context 
the tool of an inter-state complaint was used by some concerned governments, i.e. Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.2 The main particularity of the “Greek case” can be seen in 
the fact that those governments were not directly affected by the Greek events, but used the inter-
state application for the sake of the common good, i.e. the preservation of trust in the European 
human rights system. The Consultative Assembly (which later became the Parliamentary Assembly 
- PACE), had an important role because it called in a resolution on member states to bring the case 
as a collective action. This kind of “actio popularis” was taken against massive pressures and 
lobbying. The case had two stages. One of the applicants, the Netherlands, did not join the others 
when they extended their application to cover also Article 3 violations, a crucial move for the whole 
case. To bring the case meant investing significant time and resources. Establishing the facts was 
a big challenge in the circumstances of the time. The applicant states, not least because of the 
 
2  Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands vs. Greece Applications Nos. 3321-3323/67 and 3344/67 of 20th 
September 1967, Decisions of the Commission as to the Admissibility of Jan. 24, and of May 31, 1968; Report of 
the Sub-Commission on “The Greek Case” of Oct. 4, 1969, in 11 YECHR Vol. I (1969), Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague 
1972. 




many actors in the background like Amnesty International which produced a pertinent report3 felt 
a moral duty to act which has become scarce in the world of pragmatism today. 
2. Role of the European Commission on Human Rights, the Assembly and the Committee 
of Ministers 
The former European Commission of Human Rights which was in charge of the case submitted in 
September 1967 decided on its admissibility and established a Sub-Commission to examine the 
merits. It should be noted that Greece at that time had not ratified either former Article 25 ECHR 
on individual applications or former Article 46 on the compulsory jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Commission took the case very seriously and sent a fact-finding group 
to Greece making use of its powers of investigation. It needed courage to stand against the denials 
of the Greek government, in particular to interpret Article 15 ECHR on the state of emergency in a 
way that did not prevent the Commission from investigating violations of several articles of the 
Convention, not only the non-derogable ones like Article 3 ECHR which played a major role after 
the extention of the complaint in March 1968. Its Sub-Commission insisted on investigations on 
the spot and on confronting the accused with the victims, which took place in March 1969 after the 
hearings in Strasbourg in November 1968. This allowed important fact-finding on site including 
historic confrontations of victims with their torturers. However, the procedure was delayed 
because of the tactics of the Greek government. All stages were completed including negotiations 
on a possible friendly settlement. However, as this would have required basic changes it was not 
accepted by the regime. On 18 November 1969 the Commission presented its report to the 
Committee of Ministers finding that the quasi-totality of the articles of the Convention had been 
violated.4 Together with the findings of the Consultative Assembly, which had already requested 
the expulsion of Greece, the pressure on the Committee of Ministers increased. At its meeting of 
12 December 1969 several ministers emphasized that the trust, legitimacy and reason for the 
existence of the Council of Europe was at stake.5 When a two-thirds majority for a suspension of 
Greece appeared certain, the Greek government itself withdrew from the Council of Europe before 
a vote could take place resulting in a so-called “de facto suspension”. While this contributed to the 
isolation and finally the fall of the junta, the end of the dictatorship still took until July 1974. 
Subsequently, on the request of the new democratic government Greece was readmitted to the 
Council of Europe on 28 November 1974.6 
 
3  See James Becket, The Greek Case before the European Human Rights Commission, Vol. 1, No.1 HUMAN RIGHTS 91-117 
(1970); id. BARBARISM IN GREECE, A YOUNG LAWYER’S INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE WORLD’S OLDEST DEMOCRACY 
(Tower 1970). 
4  See id. at 107 et seq. The comprehensive Report of the Commission was adopted on Nov. 5, 1969; see 11 YECHR, 
Vol. II (1969).  According to the procedural rules the report could be adopted by the Committee of Ministers only 
after a three-months delay, if it was not submitted to the Court and by a two-thirds majority, which took place on 
15 April 1970; see 12 YECHR Part II (1969), 511. 
5  Peter Leuprecht, Fighting a dictatorship in the “homeland of democracy”, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPE: A HUMAN 
ENTERPRISE, 30 STORIES FOR 70 YEARS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 31-36 (Council of Europe Publishing, 2019). 
6  See Stelios Perrakis, The Greek case before the Council of Europe 1967-1974 (1998); see also The Greek Junta and 
the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967-74 (Antonis Klapsis, Constantine 
Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie F.G. Pedaliu eds., Routledge. 2020). 
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The Consultative Assembly (renamed Parliamentary Assembly in 1974) played a major role in 
addressing the challenge of the Greek coup by the colonels. It was quick to denounce the coup 
already in April 1967 thanks to an Austrian parliamentarian, Karl Czernetz, and express its solidarity 
with the Greek people,7 and it appointed a special rapporteur first in the person of Willem E. 
Siegmann and then Max van der Stoel, both from the Netherlands. Based on visits to Greece they 
produced very clear reports on the situation on the ground. Finally, Max van der Stoel was declared 
persona non grata by the Greek authorities. He was accompanied by a young civil servant by the 
name of Peter Leuprecht. In a recent article, published under the title of ”Fighting a dictatorship in 
the “homeland of democracy”” written on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment 
of the Council of Europe,8 Peter Leuprecht shared some memories of this time. According to his 
account, “the ’Greek question’ was a test case of how solid the Council was and how committed it 
was to its fundamental principles.” He reported that the Assembly was a driving force behind the 
campaign of the Council against the military regime. He had been in charge of helping the 
rapporteur on his trips and in preparing his reports, which had a major impact on the action taken 
by the Assembly. While the United States tried to persuade the Council of Europe not to take action 
against the NATO ally, the rapporteur was not convinced by the explanations of the junta that this 
was a revolution in order to establish a better democracy and that it was necessary in order to 
fight the communist threat. Leuprecht also pointed to the nationalist and religious connotations 
of the rule of the colonels. 
3. Role of personalities 
Max van der Stoel9 was the first to bring convincing evidence of the so-called “administrative 
practice of torture”. On the basis of his reports the Assembly recommended to the Committee of 
Ministers the suspension of Greece. Being a man of strong principles, he contributed to the 
isolation and finally the fall of the dictatorship. He later became foreign minister of his country, the 
Netherlands and the first High Commissioner on National Minorities of OSCE. One street in Athens 
has been named after him. His assistant at the time, Peter Leuprecht himself became Director of 
Human Rights and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. As a man of principles he 
left the Council of Europe in 1997 because he was not convinced that the admission of some new 
states which missed the necessary qualifications, such as Russia, could be absorbed by the Council 
of Europe without damage to the organization.10 
B. Impact on the Council of Europe 
1. State complaint against Turkey 
The “Greek case” appears to have had some impact a few years later, when a military coup in 
Turkey in 1980 resulted in the dissolution of the parliament and the abrogation of the 
 
7  Consultative Assembly, Decision 346 of 23 June 1967, 10 YECHR (1967), 94 et seq. 
8  Peter Leuprecht, supra note 5. 
9  Peter Leuprecht, Max van der Stoel – a tireless defender of Greek democracy, Vol. 22 SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 183-
185 (2011); see also Antoine Buyse, Max van der Stoel (1925-2011), The indefatigable Traveller, in THE FACES OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 231-238 (Kasey MacCal-Smith, Jan Wouters and Felipe Gomez Isa eds., Hart. 2019). 
10  Wolfgang Benedek, Peter Leuprecht, in THE FACES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 259-268 (Kasey MacCal-Smith, Jan Wouters and 
Felipe Gomez Isa eds., Hart. 2019). 




constitutional protection of human rights. Again, in 1982, a similar group of member states, i.e. 
Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden resorted to an inter-state application, 
claiming the violation of a whole list of human rights. The European Commission on Human Rights 
declared the complaint admissible in December 1983. The Turkish military government had 
declared a state of emergency based on Article 15 ECHR, which was not considered justified by the 
applicants when they brought their case in 1982. However, the Turkish government made some 
steps towards re-establishing democracy by organizing elections in November 1983 and dissolving 
the National Security Council. In the end, the case was terminated by a friendly settlement in 
December 1985 after a delegation of the Commission had visited Turkey that year.11 Accordingly, 
Turkey committed to a progressive lifting of its martial law, an amnesty and guarantees of the 
Convention rights. 
It should also be noted that by not recognizing the credentials of the Greek and later also of the 
Turkish deputies in 1969 and 1981 respectively, the Assembly used its powers to exclude them 
from the work of the Assembly, whereas in later cases like the ones of Russia in 2000, 2014 and 
2015 PACE limited itself to a suspension of voting rights.12 
2. Role of Council of Europe in Democratisation of Europe 
In the inter-state complaint of Austria v. Italy the European Commission on Human Rights  
formulated the principle that the Convention was not about reciprocal rights and national 
interests, but that its purpose was “to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed 
in its statute, and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the 
objective of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law.”13 This principle  appears to have been followed in the Greek case. The experience of the Greek 
case had also its effect on the accession of Portugal and Spain, when in spite of the enthusiasm 
about this enlargement after the democratization of the two countries the Assembly required a 
stringent scrutiny of the new candidates in order to ensure there was no backlash.14 
III. Relevance for Present-Day Challenges for Human Rights and 
Democracy 
A. Nature of present-day challenges 
Present-day challenges are characterized by populist and authoritarian governments, neglect of 
European values, violations of key human rights, lack of respect for the division of powers, which 
 
11  France, Norvay, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Luxembourg vs. Turkey, Application Nos. 9940-9944, Report 
by the European Commission on Human Rights of Dec. 7, 1985, YECHR 28, 150. 
12  Andrew Drzemczewski, The Parliamentary Assembly’s key role in upholding the Council of Europe’s core values, in El 
future de la Union Y la amenaza de uno no Europa. La crisis de valores de la UE (The crises of Values and the 
Future of Europe) 10, S. Sanz Caballero ed., Aranzadi. 2020). 
13  European Commission of Human Rights, Austria v. Italy, No. 235/56, Decision of 10 June 1958, 2 YECHR, 256. 
14  Roger Massie, An Iberian dawn, Portugal and Spain – 1974-1977, in EUROPE: A HUMAN ENTERPRISE, 30 STORIES FOR 70 YEARS 
OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 1949-2019, 39 et seq. (Council of Europe, 2019). 
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all form part of the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. Certainly, the Council of Europe has 
been confronted with major challenges before like the second Chechen war on the territory of a 
member state or the violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia which led to its dissolution, but this 
contribution focuses on the potential relevance of the Greek case for human rights and democracy. 
As the Freedom House report of 2019 indicates, 2018 had been the 13th year of a worldwide 
backsliding of democracy and freedom of expression as one of its key human rights.15 This raises 
the question whether the tools of the Council of Europe to protect human rights and democracy 
developed over time are sufficient and have been adequately used to counter this trend. 
B. “Socialisation effect” of membership in Council of Europe 
Which factors influence the “socialization” of member states to become guardians of common 
European values? The theory of “socialization” is based on the assumption that members of a club 
would have an interest in living up to its principles and values and thus be earning recognition and 
reputation.16 This has also been a major outcome of Council of Europe membership for new 
democracies, which benefitted from their membership to transform their political system. 
However, the attractiveness of membership has lost appeal for some member states, which seem 
to consider it - at least as much as their human rights obligations are concerned - rather as a 
burden. The same holds true for the principles of democracy and the rule of law, which for some 
governments stand in the way of their authoritarian ambitions. Against democratic backsliding 
various forms of social pressures have been used by bodies of the Council of Europe, but without 
much success. These included “dialogues” and offers of assistance, like the opinions of the Venice 
Commission, but they met with little interest if not animosity by states which have developed a 
different vision as can be seen from the cases of the Russian Federation, Turkey, Hungary and 
Poland.17 
C. Backsliding on human rights and democracy in Europe today 
The recent trend of democratic backsliding is mainly due to the emergence of populist 
governments, which revive nationalist rhetoric to establish authoritarian regimes. This trend to 
authoritarianism existing already in some Eastern European countries like Azerbaijan appears to 
have now reached also the Eastern and South-East European states, like Serbia.18 Human rights 
have come under pressure and with this also the institutions for their protection starting with the 
ECtHR. While the Council of Europe disposes of highly developed tools to protect human rights and 
democracy they seem still to be insufficient to prevent this backsliding.19 As the cases of Poland 
 
15  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019, Democracy in Retreat, Freedom House 2019, at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat (last visited 
02.12.2020). 
16  See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socialising States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013); The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance  (Thomas 
Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink eds., Cambridge University Press 2013); see also Lauri Mälksoo, Russia, 
Strasbourg, and the paradox of a human rights backlash, in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights, The 
Strasbourg Effect 19 et seq. (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. Cambridge University Press. 2018). 
17  Niels Muiznieks, The Council of Europe’s Response to Recent Democratic Backsliding, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 2019 3-31 (Philip Czech, Lisa Heschl, Karin Lukas, Manfred Nowak, Gerd Oberleitner eds., 2019). 
18  See Florian Bieber, The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkan States (palgrave macmillan. 2020). 
19  See Muiznieks, supra note 17, at 14 et seq. 




and Hungary have shown, the judicial, but also the political tools of the Council of Europe or their 
use could not prevent the democratic backsliding. This is even more so in the case of the Russian 
Federation and Turkey. In this context, it is important that the Council uses all its tools and also 
closely cooperates with the European Union, for example by establishing the facts as a basis of the 
political action by the Union. 
IV. Tools of the Council of Europe to avoid Democratic Backsliding today 
What are the main tools the Council of Europe can use to live up to its role as the democratic 
conscience of Europe today? In the following, a general overview will be provided without going 
into detail. 
A. The role of the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can be considered the major pillar against 
backsliding in the field of human rights and democracy. This is also the main reason why it has 
come under attack by those governments which consider its jurisprudence an obstacle for their 
national and sometimes nationalist policies. They were joined also by others like the UK and the 
Danish government. Those governments emphasized their sovereignty and asked for a stronger 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and of the margin of appreciation. They also used the 
undisputed need of the Court to reform its working methods in order to cope with the large 
number of cases to press for their agenda in the successive Committee of Ministers’ high-level 
conferences, the so-called ”Interlaken process”, which was declared completed in 2019. 
Fortunately, the restrictive voices did not succeed.20 The Court has also been criticized by some 
governments of being too evolutionary in its jurisprudence leaving behind states which want to 
stick to more conservative values.21 Its authority has been put in question by the non-enforcement 
or weak implementation of its judgments.22  
Regarding democratic backsliding the Court mainly deals with individual communications and 
therefore, in principle is not at ease in addressing structural issues. If it would make more use of 
the pilot case procedure this might have a stronger structural effect. But there is also the problem 
of the length of time it needs to deal with the cases and the lack of implementation of its 
judgements by some governments. For example, when the judiciary in Turkey had largely been 
brought under the control of the government and many thousands of civil servants, teachers and 
journalists removed from their positions for political reasons, the decision of the Court not to find 
a denial of justice because of a review of these decisions proposed by the Turkish government did 
not appear appropriate and left the victims with hardly any protection. In the Greek case the lack 
 
20  See Lize R. Glas, From Interlaken to Copenhagen: What has become of the Proposals Aiming to Reform the 
Functioning of the European Court of Human Rights?, Vol. 20 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 1-31 (2020). 
21  See, for example, Dimitri Bartenev, LGBT rights in Russia and European Human Rights Standards, in RUSSIA AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 326-352 (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. 
Cambridge University Press. 2018). 
22  See George Stafford, The Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Worse than You 
think – Part 2: The Hole in the Roof, EJIL:TALK!, Oct. 8, 2019. 
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of independence of the judiciary was clearly established by the Commission in spite of claims of 
the government to the contrary. Accordingly, no requirement of the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies was accepted.  Although the two cases are not of the same nature because of the 
democratic election of the Turkish government, the question of the denial of justice because of an 
inefficient remedy remains.23 
B. The role of the other key institutions of the Council of Europe 
Besides the European Court of Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) as the 
democratic representation of the parliaments of member states plays a major role in the 
development and monitoring of democracy in the member states in continuity of its role at the 
time when former dictatorships joined the Council of Europe or in the cases of Greece and Turkey. 
If the Council of Europe can be considered as a “club of democracies”, the Assembly consisting of 
324 members appointed or elected from the parliaments of all member states has a central role 
in upholding its core values.24 However, the recent past rather revealed a crisis of maintaining 
those values and of PACE altogether as will be shown later. Also, PACE as a political body in which 
the deputies of the backsliding country are represented will mainly act in very serious cases as 
could be seen in cases related to the right to life or the freedom from torture in so-called “new 
democracies” in the past. However, in the recent cases of Poland and Hungary, PACE did use its 
monitoring possibilities only to a limited extent. While it requested several legal opinions from the 
Venice Commission it did not extend its procedure of full monitoring to these countries. 
Interestingly, in 2019 Assembly decided that its monitoring committee should in the future 
produce regular periodic reviews on all member states of the Council of Europe.25 
Obviously, the Committee of Ministers always had a key role, but the enlargement of the Council 
of Europe in the 1990s has also led to a wider diversification of views, of interests and approaches, 
which makes it difficult for the Committee of Ministers to reach agreement on political matters. 
Several bodies do prepare the ground for its decisions. In the “Greek case” the Committee of 
Ministers showed itself hesitant for a while but then under the impression of the clear findings 
from the European Commission on Human Rights and the Assembly as well as public opinion it 
acted according to its responsibilities. But because of the Greek withdrawal it did not have to use 
its powers under Article 8 of the Statute to suspend or expel Greece from the organization because 
of a violation of its standards and there has been no other case where this has ever happened. 
Indeed, the Assembly representing national parliaments rather than governments is more inclined 
to react to major violations of those standards and thus act as the “conscience of Europe” although 
this did not happen in all instances, as the case of Azerbaijan shows. 26 
 
23  See Köksal v. Turkey, Application no. 70478/16 of Jun. 12, 2017, in which the Court decided that civil servants 
dismissed after the attempted coup had first to bring their complaint to a state commission set up for that 
purpose, the decision of which had then to be appealed to an administrative court and finally petitioned to the 
Constitutional Court before the person could address an application to the European Court of Human Rights. 
24  Andrew Drzemczewski, The Parliamentary Assembly’s key role in upholding the Council of Europe’s core values, in El 
futuro de la Union Y la amenaza de uno no Europa. La crisis de valores de la UE (The crises of Values and the 
Future of Europe) 43-56, S. Sanz Caballero ed., Aranzadi. 2020). 
25  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2325 (2020) of Jan. 30, 2020 on The progress of the 
Assembly’s monitoring procedure (January – December 2019), para. 5.1. 
26  Drzemczewski, supra note 24, at 49 et seq. 




One major mechanism is the Venice Commission for Democracy through Law created in 1990, 
which has built a reputation for its high-quality opinions, produced to guide the political bodies on 
the national and European levels. Importantly, the services of the Venice Commission can be 
requested by a wide range of actors, going beyond the 62 states parties to the Venice Commission. 
Requests may come not only from the Council of Europe like PACE, but also from the European 
Parliament or OSCE. For example, during the recent state of emergency in Turkey, on the request 
of the Monitoring Committee of PACE the Venice Commission provided an opinion on the 
emergency laws.27 In the case of Hungary, between 2011 and 2019, the Venice Commission 
prepared 18 opinions, most of which, however, had little effect.28 The same can be said on the 
numerous opinions produced in the cases of the Russian Federation and Turkey.  The findings and 
advice of the Venice Commission are important because they highlight legal problems, but they 
are not always appreciated, in particular if they are critical of government policies. Accordingly, it 
is the task of all interested actors starting from the requesting institution to strengthen its authority 
against unwilling governments as the opinions themselves are only advisory.  
Mainly as a result of the challenges from its enlargement by numerous “new democracies” in the 
1990s leading to a doubling of its membership from 23 Western European states to a pan-
European organization of 47 states, the Council of Europe has created a number of additional 
mechanisms like the Advisory Committee on National Minorities, the European Commission on 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the European Commissioner for Human Rights, all of which have 
strengthened the political role of the Council of Europe. The European Committee against Torture 
(CPT) as a preventive mechanism had already been established in 1987.29 In view of the fact that 
some new members were admitted for political reasons before they had attained the necessary 
standards, also monitoring systems were set up for the new and then all member states by PACE 
and by the Committee of Ministers on a temporary basis, the latter addressing certain thematic 
key human rights.30 Since 1994, new members had to accept the ECHR together with some other 
key conventions within a year and since Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR of 1998 came into force, all 
new members had to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. As already shown the two main human 
rights bodies were merged into one, the single European Court of Human Rights strengthening the 
judicial approach. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law were reconfirmed as the key value 
basis of the Council of Europe, but the enlargement also increased the problems of compliance. 
The European Commissioner for Human Rights is a more activist institution, which has been 
created in 1999 with a general mandate to fill gaps within the protection system. In cases of 
democratic and human rights backsliding the Commissioner can get involved in various ways like 
 
27  Venice Commission, Turkey – Opinion No. 865/2016 on Emergency Decree Laws Nos 667-676 adopted following 
the failed coup of Jul. 15, 2016 (Dec. 12, 2016). 
28  See the opinions on the website of the Venice Commission, at 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?country=17&year=all&other=true (last visited 
02.12.2020). 
29  Renate Kicker, The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture: a success story?, in THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
PIONEER AND GUARANTOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (Renate Kicker ed., Council of Europe, 2010); RENATE KICKER, 
MARKUS MÖSTL, STANDARD-SETTING THROUGH MONITORING? THE ROLE OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPERT BODIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Council of Europe 2012). 
30  ALINE ROYER, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, at 40 et seq. (Council of Europe 2010). 
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public statements, reports or personal visits. The Commissioner has a particular focus on the 
protection of human rights defenders. For this reason, she or he closely monitors the human rights 
situation on the ground. The Commissioner can act quickly on human rights issues by statements 
or country visits and reports, opinions and by mobilising the media.31 She or he can appear as a 
third party before the Court as it happened in a recent Grand Chamber case against Turkey.32 
Unfortunately, the Commissioner, in addressing human rights backsliding of countries, can only 
sound the alarm and mobilise action as well as help in individual cases.  
In reaction to the problems of the backlash affecting several democracies in Europe the Secretary 
General became more involved, which mostly happened behind the scenes by way of silent 
diplomacy.  As his successes remained limited one way of speaking up was the Annual Report on 
Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law published for the years between 2014 and 2018. 
For example, the annual report on democracy, human rights and the rule of law of 2018, without 
mentioning a single state, draws attention to the disturbing outcome of populism, which had been 
a focus of the 2017 report, and identifies alarming threats to the institutions of human rights 
protection, like the judiciary, key human rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly and association as well as threats to democratic institutions and to inclusive societies 
which the report found to be undermined at the national and regional levels. It calls for a re-
commitment to shared values and the defense of the institutions.33  
Another tool of the Secretary General is the inquiry procedure under Article 52, according to which 
a member state on request by the Secretary General has to provide “an explanation of the manner 
in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the 
Convention.” This possibility has so far has been used only a few times, but could be used more 
actively. For example, in the context of the emergency measures taken by numerous states in 
response to the COVID-19 crises without formally resorting to the notification of a state of 
emergency according to Article 15 ECHR it has been suggested to use this tool to meet loopholes 
in the system of supervision of derogations. This has already been recommended by PACE in its 
Resolution 2209 according to which, inter alia, the Secretary General should open an inquiry under 
Article 52 in relation to any state which derogates from the Convention.34 
C. Role of civil society, media and academia 
Today, civil society faces a shrinking space in Europe as can be seen from the situation of human 
rights defenders in Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Russian Federation in particular. One example was 
the trial of Oyub Titiev, the head of the human rights centre of the Russian human rights NGO 
“Memorial” in Grozny, who after denouncing forced disappearances and torture was put on trial 
on fabricated charges of possession of narcotic drugs in early 2018. His case received much 
 
31  Muizniek, supra note 17, at 11 et seq. 
32  Hearing of the Grand Chamber of Sep. 18, 2019 on pre-trial detention of Selahattin Demirtas, Selahattin Demirtas 
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33  Report by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjoern Jagland, State of Democracy, Human Rights 
and the Rule of Law, Role of institutions, Threats to institutions, Council of Europe, May 2018. 
34  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2209 of Apr. 24, 2018 on State of emergency – 
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attention and he was awarded the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize by the Parliamentary Assembly 
in November 2018. In 2019 he received a relatively mild sentence allowing for his release soon 
after, but could not continue his work in Chechnya any more. The shrinking space for civil society 
in Europe has also been addressed by a pertinent recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
of 2018, which requested Member States to provide an enabling legal framework and a conducive 
political environment as well as effective measures to protect and promote civil society space.35 
Civil society partly derives its strength from its access to the media, which disseminate its findings 
and requests and thus allow it to mobilize public opinion. The media themselves, in particular by 
way of investigative journalism play an indispensable role for denouncing human rights violations, 
by “naming and shaming”. Both can influence public opinion, which is crucial in pursuing a case 
against a government as can be seen from the “Greek case”.36  
Academia has the role of researching and analyzing, interpreting obligations and commenting on 
the appropriateness and consistency of international action. It might also provide assistance to 
victims in accessing national and international remedies as can be shown for the case of Russia.37 
It has recently been facing an anti-elitist sentiment by populist governments, but its contribution 
is needed for the development of policies based on facts as shown by the COVID-19 crises. 
D. Case studies of Russian Federation and Turkey 
1. Russian Federation 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, succeeded by the Russian Federation (RF), the latter 
applied for membership in the Council of Europe. The application was granted in 1996 in spite of 
the results of fact-finding by PACE which showed that the Russian Federation was not as yet in a 
position to meet the membership criteria.38 Nonetheless, in order not to lose the window of 
opportunity of the Russian interest in accession, the Russian Federation was admitted in 1996 with 
the understanding that the commitments entered into upon accession and the monitoring 
procedure would help Russia to undertake the necessary reforms.   The accession meant that 
Russia also became a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and had to accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which by the reform of 1998 became 
a single institution to decide all cases. Since, the RF has been found in violation of its obligations in 
thousands of cases, which in the early period of its membership led to important legal reforms in 
which the newly established Constitutional Court of the RF had a key role. The Convention and the 
Court and their “Strasbourg effect” were welcome to support the modernization and 
 
35  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of Nov. 28, 2018 on the need to 
strengthen the protection and promotion of civil society space in Europe.  
36  Anne-Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms 42 et seq. 
(Princeton University Press 2001).  
37  See, Anton Burkov, The use of European human rights law in Russian courts, in RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 59 et seq. (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. Cambridge University Press. 
2018); Philip Leach, Egregious human rights violations in Chechnya: appraising the pursuit of justice, id., 255 et seq. 
38  Petra Roter, Russia in the Council of Europe: Participation à la carte, in RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 40 et seq. (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. Cambridge University Press. 2018); see 
the opinion by PACE on Russia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe, Doc. 7463 of Jan. 18, 1996. 
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Europeanization of the Russian legal system.39 However, a degradation in the relationship can be 
observed since about 2008 and in particular 2012 when the Court decided some cases against the 
expectations of the RF. The cases of Markin, Catan and Others and Alekseyev need to be highlighted 
in this context.40 With the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Western counter-measures this 
trend was reinforced. But the Russian attitude towards Western values also changed as a result of 
its decision to rather develop a Russian nativist approach.41 The situation culminated in 2018, when 
the Duma gave the Constitutional Court new powers to review the conformity of the judgments of 
the ECtHR with the constitution of the Russian Federation. Although in practice these new powers 
have only been used in two cases42 so far, the RF can now feel more at ease to deny the 
enforcement of Court judgments, which in some cases has been slow anyway.43 Still, with a 
compliance rate of 26.53% (2017) the performance of the RF has been better than the performance 
of several other member states while the Council of Europe average is 72.6%.44 It can be taken as 
a positive sign that in 2019 the RF found a way to comply with the judgment in Anchugov and 
Gladkov as announced by the Council of Europe although the Russian Constitutional Court at the 
time had held that it was impossible to comply.45 
The Council of Europe member state Azerbaijan is known for problems of compliance. In the 
notorious Mammadov case, the Committee of Ministers for the first time used the infringement 
procedure under Article 46 (4) ECHR referring the case to the European Court of Human Rights for 
refusal to abide by a final judgment. The Grand Chamber of the Court unanimously found a 
violation.46 In the context of the work of PACE it was found that Azerbaijan had bribed several PACE 
members with gifts and high payments, which raised the question of the credibility of the 
institution. PACE finally reacted to the revelations mainly coming from the NGO “European Stability 
 
39  See Alexei Trochev, The Russian Constitutional Court and the Strasbourg Court: judicial pragmatism in a dual state, in 
RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 125-149 (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek 
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40  See the decisions on Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Application no. 30078/06 of 2012 (GC), Catan and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia, Applications nos. 43370/04, 8252/05  and 18404/06 of 2012 (GC) as well as Alekseyev v. Russia, 
Applications nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09 of 2011; see also Bill Bowring, Russia’s cases in the ECtHR and 
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HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 188-221 (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. Cambridge University Press. 
2018). 
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Court as a last bastion for the credibility of the Council of Europe, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 325-335 
(2018); see also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 2019, 13th Annual Report, Council of Europe 2020. 
45  See CM/ResDH(2019)240 of Sep. 25, 2019. 
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Initiative” (ESI) by establishing an external investigation which confirmed most of the allegations 
and led to sanctions against a number of parliamentarians involved.47  
The sanction of stripping the Russian members of PACE of their voting rights after the illegal 
occupation of Crimea in 2014 put particular stress on the relations between the Council of Europe 
and the RF. The latter responded to it by boycotting the work of the Assembly by not sending their 
deputies anymore and not allowing any PACE rapporteurs to visit the RF; furthermore it froze its 
sizable financial contribution and threatened to withdraw from the Council of Europe altogether. 
Members of the Russian Duma, but also academia also severely criticized the judgments of the 
Court in certain cases like the ones related to same sex relationships.48 After a face-saving 
agreement reached in May 201949 the Russian PACE members returned and the RF resumed its 
contributions. Still fundamental differences remain and the situation of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law in the RF has been characterized by a continuous backsliding as can be seen by 
the laws on banning the propaganda of homosexuality, on declaring certain human rights NGOs 
as foreign agents and, in particular, the human rights situation in Chechnya.  
The situation of human rights in the Chechen Republic, which in the past experienced major 
violations during the Chechen wars, became notorious again in 2017, after several purges of LGBTI 
people and alleged summary executions of presumed terrorists. There were reports of a persistent 
pattern of torture by the security forces in Chechnya. In reaction, a group of 16 Contracting Parties 
of OSCE resorted to the Moscow Mechanism to enable an investigation of the allegations in a 
report done by a single rapporteur because the RF contrary to its obligations declined any 
cooperation.50 In March 2019 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
resorted to the rare tool of a public statement, in which it made some of the findings of its visit of 
2017 public and deplored that the RF authorities had not been ready to react to its findings for a 
long period.51  
 
47  See Report of the Independent Investigation Body on the allegations of corruption within the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Apr. 15, 2018, at http://assembly.coe.int/Communication/IBAC/IBAC-GIAC-Report-EN.pdf (last visited 
02.12.2020); the Assembly consequently adopted resolution 2216 (2018) of Apr. 26, 2018 declaring “zero tolerance 
for corruption”. 
48  See Dmitri Bartenev, LGBT rights in Russia and European human rights standards, in RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 326-351 (Lauri Mälksoo, Wolfgang Benedek eds. Cambridge University 
Press. 2018). 
49  See PACE Resolution 2287 (2019) of Jun. 25, 2019 on “Strengthening the decision-making of the Parliamentary 
Assembly concerning credentials and voting”; see also Andrew Drzemczewski, The (Non-) Participation of Russian 
Parliamentarians in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: an Overview of Recent Developments, EUROPE 
OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2020), forthcoming; Lize R. Glas, Russia left, threatened and won: Its return to the Assembly 
without sanctions, Strasbourg Observers of Jul. 2, 2019, at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/07/02/russia-
left-threatened-and-has-won-its-return-to-the-assembly-without-sanctions/ (last visited 02.12.2020). 
50  See OSCE Rapporteur’s Report under the Moscow Mechanism on the alleged human Rights Violations and 
Impunity in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation of Dec. 13, 2018 by Professor Dr. Wolfgang Benedek, 
at https://www.osce.org/odihr/407402?download=true (last visited 02.12.2020).  
51  Council of Europe, Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Public Statement of Mar. 11, 2019 on the Russian 
Federation concerning the Chechen Republic and other republics of the North Caucasian region, CP/Inf (2019)6; 
see Council of Europe anti-torture Committee urges the Russian Federation to carry out effective investigations 
into allegations of torture in the Northern Caucasian region, at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-
europe-anti-torture-committee-urges-the-russian-federation-to-carry-out-effective-investigations-into-
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Generally, the member states being preoccupied with the situation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
have shown only limited interest in using the tools of the Council of Europe in the case of the 
Chechen Republic while PACE has been very active by pursuing reports like the one on the 
persecution of LGBTI people in the Chechen Republic of 2018.52 The Secretary General in his annual 
report of 2018 referred to the critique by PACE regarding the harassment of opposition activists 
and NGOs and their request to abrogate the law on foreign agents. The Russian government 
declines responsibility for the events in Chechnya although it is legally responsible for human 
rights violations in its Republic. Without a more concerted action of Council of Europe member 
states, the highly problematic human rights situation in which investigative journalists, human 
rights organizations and anyone critical of the government find themselves at risk might not 
improve. 
2. Turkey 
After a time of degradation of democracy and freedom of expression in Turkey and the attempted 
coup by parts of the army, the following state of emergency of 2016 led to a massive repression of 
people considered as Gülenists and anybody critical of the Erdogan government in the public 
sphere. In this context some 150 000 civil servants were purged, 77 000 charged for suspected 
links to the coup, some 4000 judges and prosecutors were dismissed and also a large number of 
academics lost their positions. Many found themselves in prison together with numerous 
journalists and elected parliamentarians from the mainly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), 
which became a particular object of government repression.  Some 700 journalists lost their 
accreditation. The Commission set up by the Turkish government in agreement with the Council 
of Europe in 2017 to review the cases of the civil servants by 2018 had only reviewed 36 000 cases, 
with only about 2300 persons reinstated in their positions.  Some 50 000 persons had been 
charged with terrorism while many others were waiting in pre-trial detention to be charged.53 
While the Turkish government on the initiative of the Ministry of Justice in 2014 still had adopted 
an Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations,54 there was little progress from 2015 onwards. 
Joint projects of the Council of Europe and the European Union like the one on strengthening the 
capacity of the Turkish judiciary on freedom of expression were undermined by political events 
while nearing completion.55 After the Vaclav Havel prize had been awarded by PACE in November 
2017 to Murat Aslan, former chair of the judges and prosecutors  arrested by Turkey in 2016 for 
suspected links to the Fetullahist Organization considered responsible for the military coup, Turkey 
also withdrew its voluntary support for the Council of Europe where it had become one of the six 
major funders.56 
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The European Parliament reacted with a resolution against the restrictions of freedom of 
expression, which had started well before the coup, at the end of 2014,57 while the European Court 
of Human Rights found a violation of freedom of expression in the blocking of YouTube by the 
Turkish government.58 While YouTube was able to go online again, the Kurdish politician Selahattin 
Demirtas, co-chair of the HDP, which had been very successful in the elections of June 2015 and 
who was arrested in 2016 is still in prison although the Court in 2018 found that the length of his 
pre-trial detention could not be justified and that he should be released at the earliest possible 
date. President Erdogan is on record saying that the judgments of the Court were not binding for 
Turkey. Already in December 2017 the Constitutional Court of Turkey had found his application 
inadmissible. Indeed, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court, which in 
September 2019 held a hearing in this case. At the hearing the European Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Dunja Mijatovic accused the Turkish government of using the judiciary to silence critics.59 
The well-known Turkish law professor Kerem Altiparmak is on record for having characterized this 
case as a symbol for Turkey’s struggle for democracy and the state of law.60 
After the failed military coup on 15-16 July 2016 a state of emergency was declared on 22 July 2016. 
It was prolonged six times until 8 August 2018 after Tayyip Erdogan had been sworn in as president 
under the newly established presidential system, which gave him far-reaching powers as a result 
of the constitutional changes accepted by referendum in April 2017. The Turkish state of 
emergency after the attempted coup and the reaction by the Council of Europe raises several 
issues discussed below under the section on state of emergency. 
The Parliamentary Assembly actively responded to the degrading situation of human rights and 
democracy in Turkey after the Coup by expressing serious concerns about the proportionality of 
the emergency measures and requesting the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Venice Commission and of the European Commissioner for Human Rights. In its resolution of 2017 
on Turkey the Parliamentary Assembly announced the reopening of its monitoring procedure for 
Turkey until its concerns were addressed in a satisfactory manner.61 At the time this procedure 
was also still applied to nine other member states including the Russian Federation. 
Unfortunately, in its decision in the case of  Zihni v.Turkey62 the European Court of Human Rights 
did not consider the thousands of complaints of civil servants as well as many complaints from 
other sources as applicable but referred the complainants to the troublesome domestic remedies, 
which in practice were not effective.63 The establishment of an Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission after 
consultations with the Council of Europe based on emergency decree law No. 685 with the 
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possibility of appeal to the Ankara administrative courts led to another decision on exhaustion of 
local remedies64 and the striking off of some 12.600 cases by the Court. The functioning of this 
decree law as effective remedy is denied by Turkish legal experts.65 In conclusion, instead of using 
its pilot case procedure the Court left the victims of the political purges largely unprotected. 
Recently again, the Court decided in the prominent case of Kavala that the person had to be 
released immediately. In this case the Court also found a violation of Article 18 of the Convention 
finding an abuse of power by the extended detention of a human rights defender in order to 
silence him.66 The EU has followed up requesting Turkey to act on the judgment, but so far without 
any result.67 
In the case of several journalists, the judgment of the ECtHR was undermined as they were 
released, but then put in detention again based on new accusations.68 
The member states are the guardians of the European Convention and of the system of human 
rights protection build on it.  They are supposed to act in the general European public interest. 
What has been the reaction by member states of the Council of Europe, have inter-state 
applications been considered at all against the systematic violations of human rights and the 
backsliding of democracy in Turkey? Obviously not, although this would have been a powerful 
signal to the Turkish president. 
3. Similarities and Differences to the “Greek Case” 
In order to draw useful conclusions, it is important to note the similarities and differences. The 
“Greek case” may be considered as an extreme one, but in the structure of events there are 
similarities to be found and lessons to be learned. 
The main similarity is the need for determined action on behalf of member states in order to 
preserve the human  rights system. The main difference obviously is the fact that the military coup 
in the “Greek case” abolished democracy and introduced a military government, which was using 
torture as a general means of oppression, at least in the first phase. Such a government should 
not have a place within democratic nations. In the context of the European Union there is Article 7 
to respond to such cases of backlash.  
However, the crucial question is what to do with authoritarian governments which use populist 
and sometimes even fascist policies in order to stay in power. They are usually democratically 
elected, but do not respect the values of the Council of Europe or the EU. They have not – as yet – 
reintroduced the death penalty (as Erdogan threatened to do). They generally accept the 
judgments of the ECtHR, but may not implement those they dislike. They pursue a so-called 
“illiberal democracy”, which is alien to the foundations of the Council of Europe.   
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The findings and recommendations of the opinions of the Venice Commission are often ignored 
as they are not welcome to the governments pursuing a different policy. 
Where to draw the red line, which is in danger of being redrawn all the time? There is a need of 
stronger vigilance as any softening and compromise might damage the common good and the 
common concern, the European system of human rights. 
4. Dealing with a state of emergency 
In several cases, like in the “Greek case”, states of emergency have been announced by 
governments in order to free themselves from obligations under the Convention. The “Greek case” 
stands for the approach of the European Commission on Human Rights to insist on a right to 
review whether a state of emergency was justified and whether the measures taken by states were 
necessary for a legitimate purpose. Both, in the “Greek case” as well as in the Turkish case in the 
1980s, the Commission did not find the declared states of emergency justified. The state of 
emergency after the recent attempted coup in Turkey can be considered as an “entrenched” 
derogation, while derogations under Article 15 according to the findings of international bodies 
and the doctrine should be temporary.69 This raises the question of an abuse of the right similar 
to the British proposal to derogate from the ECHR in future extraterritorial military operations.70 It 
is worth noting that the PACE rapporteur on State of Emergency in his report adopted by the 
Assembly concluded that derogations must be limited in duration71 and questioned the derogation 
made by France to address “lasting” terrorist threats. Regarding Turkey the report found that the 
length of the derogation exceeded what was strictly required.72 The practice of the Court, however, 
seems to suggest that there is no obligation of temporariness as this also does not appear in Article 
15.73 The Court somewhat disturbingly also does not consider derogatory measures under a state 
of emergency as “urgent cases”, which shows a potential discrepancy with the approach taken by 
the Assembly.  In resolution 2209 on state of emergency the Assembly proposed that the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe should use its powers under Article 52 ECHR on “inquiries by the 
Secretary General” to open an inquiry in the case of any state derogating from the Convention.74 
This recommendation has been taken up in the literature in the COVID-19 crises when several 
states notified a state of emergency.75 However, this issue cannot be further pursued in the context 
of this contribution.  
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In the “Greek case”, the European Commission on Human Rights took an active position in 
reviewing the state of emergency and found that it was not justified. This was also the position of 
the Assembly at the time. This case could serve as guidance for a more active role of Council of 
Europe bodies today, including a review of the justification of a state of emergency and the 
proportionality of the measures taken as suggested by PACE. 
V. General Conclusions and Recommendations 
What are the lessons learned, what is the message of the “Greek case” – that member states 
devoted to human rights make full use of existing remedies? The system of human rights 
protection knows strong elements of “peer review”, in the UN since 2006 in the form of the 
recurrent Universal Periodic Review and in OSCE since 1989 and 1991 respectively in form of the 
Vienna and Moscow Mechanisms, to be employed by concerned participating states. But a 
comparison between the judicial inter-state complaint of the Council of Europe and the non-judicial 
Moscow Mechanism shows large differences: the decisions of a judicial mechanism cannot be so 
easily ignored; could an increased use of inter-state cases lead to self-suspension like in the “Greek 
case”? Is there a danger that the threats of withdrawal of the Russian Federation or the UK being 
unhappy with certain decisions will be realized? There are several interstate-cases before the Court 
as much as the Russian Federation is concerned, like Ukraine v. Russia and Georgia v. Russia but 
they are not of the same nature as the Greek case because they all pursue specific state interests. 
It is also of great importance  that hundreds of individual cases every year are decided against the 
RF and Turkey providing their citizens with some relief and sending a message to the governments 
how to avoid future violations. The same is true for the findings and recommendations of the other 
human rights bodies of the Council of Europe. 
However, while the “Greek case” belongs to a period of relatively frequent inter-state applications, 
which is also due to the fact that individual communications and the European Court of Human 
Rights were not as yet generally accepted, since the merger of 1998 and the general existence of a 
right to individual applications, the emphasis has definitely moved to the latter. But individual 
applications are not best suited to deal with democratic backsliding and the preparedness of 
member states to use the inter-state application for the common interest of safeguarding 
European democratic standards is low.  
Generally, the impact of the system also depends on whether the state in question cares about its 
reputation. Otherwise, blaming and shaming has little effect. For example, the Russian Federation 
does compensate individuals as requested by the Court, but hardly takes the necessary legislative 
or other structural measures in order to prevent the same cases to come up again. The RF thus 
does not seem to care about the number of cases generated by this practice. With regard to Turkey, 
the government until about 2014 was very keen on claiming that there were no journalists in prison 
in Turkey. However, since late 2014, well before the attempted coup it seems not to care anymore 
about its reputation in this respect and since has one of the highest numbers of journalists in 
prison worldwide.76 
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Regarding Turkey, as in the “Greek case” at the time, there is also the argument that its status of a 
NATO ally should be taken into account although Turkey is not an easy one. Typically, from the 
perspective of a state government other political – and economic – considerations may outweigh 
the human rights ones. 
Does the size of the country matter? In the case of the Russian Federation this might be the case. 
The Council of Europe suffered a lot from the withholding of the Russian contribution, which with 
EUR 32.6 Mio in 2019 was one of the largest of its members. In the case of Russia, this country has 
annexed a part of another member state and went away with it, an unprecedented case in spite of 
the creation of breakaway regimes in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and Moldavia 
(Transnistria), also with Russian involvement.77  
The “toolbox” of the Council of Europe for the protection of human rights in its member states has 
significantly increased over time. But this could not prevent or remedy major backlashes of human 
rights and democracy as described. This raises the question whether the tools of the Council are 
not strong enough to prevent backsliding or whether they have not being used strongly enough? 
The Council of Europe is sometimes called the democratic conscience of Europe. In the recent 
years, the Council has come under pressure to live up to its mandate, also because it lacked full 
support from its member states. There is a common accountability towards history. What would 
have been the reputation of the Council with the Greek, but also many other peoples if it had given 
in to pressures not to act at the time? Any dictatorship, but also every authoritarian government 
ends some time and then those who betrayed their principles will be held accountable. Therefore, 
the maintenance of a principled position in line with the mandate is key even if it cannot be 
enforced at the moment. The Council of Europe and its institutions are constantly put to the test 
by regressive forces and can only grow in meeting those challenges. They might have lost appeal, 
in particular for authoritarian states, but they still are needed to provide some legitimacy to 
governments. 
It is also important to insist on fact-finding, on investigations on the spot. Countries like the Russian 
Federation have refused to allow PACE rapporteurs and even the European Commissioner for 
Human Rights to visit the country in response to measures taken against them. Only after the face-
saving agreement between the Council and Russia was concluded, such visits became possible 
again. Today there is an increasing practice of “joint responses” – several bodies act together within 
their mandates. A more coordinated response can increase its efficiency. Like in the United 
Nations, where there is an growing practice of joint action, such as joint visits and statements by 
several special rapporteurs could Council of Europe bodies join forces, at least the non-judicial 
ones.  
The Parliamentary Assembly recommended to strengthen the authority of the Council by a “joint 
response procedure” of a more structured coordination between PACE, the Committee of 
Ministers and the Secretary General in cases of violations of the statutory obligations by member 
states.78 It shows that there is an urgent need to preserve the legitimacy of the Council through 
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78  Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2277 (2019) of Apr. 10, 2019 on Role and mission of the Parliamentary 
Assembly: main challenges for the future, Para. 15.3 and 15.4. 
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reacting to major challenges to its key values and obligations. Accordingly, the tools exist, but a 
more courageous approach is needed. 
The argument that the Council of Europe can only preserve its influence and also provide its 
services – such as the ECtHR - for the benefit of the citizen if it does not suspend rights of a member 
state has the potential of limiting possible choices. In the case of the RF and also Turkey this 
argument makes sense as long as these countries remain within certain red lines which also means 
that the Council can still have an impact. The reintroduction of the death penalty, a general denial 
of implementation of ECtHR judgments or a practice of systematic torture could be considered 
such red lines. Beyond them the credibility and legitimacy of the European human rights system 
would be at stake. To use the possibility of suspension or expulsion as a last resort may be justified. 
As previous cases show this would not necessarily mean that the country in question will withdraw 
forever, because as the European geography cannot be changed it will have to come back in 
particular when a new government takes over. 
With regard to the responsibility of member states as guardians of European values no state 
complaints have been made since the Greek and Turkish cases to protect the system from 
backsliding in Council of Europe member states. This ultimate tool of peer review remains unused 
although according to Article 33 of the Convention it can be used in the case of any alleged breach 
of the Convention and not only for the most serious breaches like a change of the political system 
by force. Member states today are using the inter-state complaint mainly for their own interest in 
relations among themselves like in the recent case of Slovenia v. Croatia.79 The question is whether 
they should not make more use of this remedy again for preserving the common interest,80 for 
dealing with major cases of democratic backsliding. This would not be just idealistic, but serve the 
European public interest common to all member states. There are few cases outside the protection 
system of the Council of Europe like Gambia v. Myanmar where such a public interest approach has 
been pursued.81 The use of inter-state complaints presently is increasing, but not as regards cases 
of common interest.82 The Greek case provides an example how this tool could be used in the 
public interest of the European protection system. 
Today, there are more actors and better structures, but also a lack of personalities, in particular 
also on the side of governments to push for using the tools of the Council of Europe for the 
common interest. There is a need for more courageous personalities, who show leadership. 
Summing up, the Council of Europe is still fighting for democracy as it did 50 years ago, but the 
challenges are different: they are not as deep as the dictatorship at the time, but they are wider as 
there are a larger number of problematic member states and situations, which provide different 
challenges to the European human rights system. Will the Council of Europe, which recently has 
celebrated 70 years of its existence, be prepared to meet the wider challenges and make full use 
of its variety of tools and will the member states be ready to support the Council of Europe in this 
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effort and also use their own possibilities like the inter-state complaint? It remains to be seen how 
the human enterprise of a Europe based on pluralist democracy and human rights will continue.83 
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